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Abstract
	Robert Proctor has argued that ignorance or non-knowledge can be fruitfully divided into at least three categories: (1) ignorance as native state or starting point; (2) ignorance as lost realm or selective choice; and (3) ignorance as strategic ploy or active construct.  This chapter explores Proctor’s second category, ignorance as selective choice.  When scientists investigate poorly understood phenomena, they have to make selective choices about what questions to ask, what research strategies and metrics to employ, and what language to use for describing the phenomena.  This chapter focuses especially on the selective choice of language for describing and categorizing phenomena in the face of uncertainty.  Using several case studies from recent pollution research, I show that linguistic choices are especially significant when we have severely limited knowledge, because those choices can emphasize and highlight some aspects of our limited knowledge rather than others.  These selective emphases can in turn influence societal decision making, and they can exacerbate the selectivity of our knowledge by further steering scientific research in some directions rather than others.  I conclude with some suggestions for developing scientific language in socially responsible ways, even in the face of significant ignorance and uncertainty.

1. Introduction
	In both the academic and the popular literature, numerous authors have recently drawn attention to the importance of scientific uncertainty, doubt, and ignorance.  Some authors have examined the ways that interest groups attempt to manipulate scientific information in order to create false impressions about the ignorance or uncertainty present in the scientific community (McGarity and Wagner 2008; Michaels 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2010).  Others highlight the complexities of developing public policy in the face of scientific uncertainty (Cranor 1993; Sunstein 2005; Tickner 2003).  Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger (2008) recently edited a volume that attempted to analyze the phenomenon of ignorance in science from a wide range of perspectives.  In his introductory essay for the book, Proctor (2008) suggested that the phenomenon of ignorance or non-knowledge could be fruitfully divided into at least three categories: (1) ignorance as native state or starting point; (2) ignorance as lost realm or selective choice; and (3) ignorance as strategic ploy or active construct.
	This paper focuses especially on Proctor’s second category, ignorance as selective choice.  As Proctor puts it: 
We look here rather than there; we have the predator’s fovea (versus the indiscriminate watchfulness of prey), and the decision to focus on this is therefore invariably a choice to ignore that.  Ignorance is a product of inattention, and since we cannot study all things, some by necessity—almost all, in fact—must be left out. (2008, 7; italics in original)
It is important to note that this selectivity can involve more than just decisions about what topics to study.  Scientists are also forced to make selective choices about what specific questions to ask, what research strategies and metrics to employ, and what language to use for describing phenomena.  This paper focuses especially on the last issue—the ways in which scientists selectively choose language for describing and categorizing poorly understood phenomena.  I will argue that, insofar as these choices draw attention to some features of the phenomena rather than others, they perpetuate selective research, understanding, and policy making in the future.   
Section 2 examines several case studies from recent pollution research, highlighting how researchers have to selectively choose some descriptions and categorizations of a phenomenon rather than others when they face a good deal of uncertainty.  The next section shows how these choices can influence both future research on the phenomenon and social responses to it.  Finally, Section 4 proposes some strategies for responding to these influences in socially responsible ways.   

2. Selective Language in Pollution Research
	In his book Science, Truth, and Democracy (2001), Philip Kitcher challenges the notion that there is a privileged way (independent of human capacities and interests) to divide nature into objects and to sort those objects into kinds; instead, he argues that these activities depend on contingent judgments of what is significant to us (see also Mitchell 2010).  He illustrates his position by drawing a comparison to map-makers:
Map-makers are invariably selective…. [W]e understand how maps designed for different purposes pick out different entities within a region or depict those entities rather differently….  We would abandon the idea that cartography is governed by a context-independent goal.  Perhaps we should lose similar baggage in thinking about the sciences generally. (Kitcher 2001, 60)
	Kitcher’s notion that natural kinds cannot be specified in the absence of human capacities and interests is admittedly a controversial one.  However, his position does seem fairly compelling in the sorts of cases considered throughout this book and in the present chapter, where scientists have very limited knowledge of the phenomena under investigation.  In other words, even if one holds that there are legitimate natural kinds, those natural categories are typically not apparent when scientists are working under conditions of great uncertainty or ignorance.  In such cases, scientists clearly have to make underdetermined choices about how to describe phenomena and divide them into categories.  Those choices unavoidably draw attention to some features of the phenomena while deemphasizing other features, with subsequent effects on society at large and on the course of future scientific research.
	These ways in which linguistic choices reflect and perpetuate selective ignorance are somewhat different from other forms of selective ignorance in science.  When scientists simply choose to investigate one domain of phenomena rather than another, they end up learning about one set of phenomena and failing to know about others.  The form of selective ignorance associated with linguistic choices is more subtle.  It involves selective attention to or emphasis on some features of a phenomenon rather than others.  It has many similarities to the story (common to a number of Eastern religious traditions) about a group of blind men encountering an elephant.  Each man touches a part of the elephant (e.g., the trunk, the leg, the body, the tail) and provides a description of the elephant based solely on that part, thereby ignoring its other features.  Like the blind men, scientific language can promote selective understanding of phenomena.  
	This section provides three case studies of the selective categorization and description of poorly understood phenomena associated with environmental pollution.  When government agencies, corporations, or environmental groups assess the risks associated with toxic chemicals, they are typically forced to extrapolate from the sorts of effects that they observe in high-dose studies to the effects that would be expected at much lower levels of chemical exposure.  It is frequently assumed (e.g., by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Occupational Safety and Health Administration) that the toxic effects observed at high dose levels progressively diminish with decreasing dose levels of a toxic substance and disappear either at some “threshold” dose level or at zero dosage.  
All three case studies considered in this section (endocrine disruption, hormesis, and multiple chemical sensitivity) raise questions about the standard picture of chemical toxicity.  The phenomenon of endocrine disruption (ED) occurs when toxicants mimic hormones such as estrogen or otherwise interfere with the hormonal system.  Although researchers are still exploring the nature of ED, it appears that it can produce harmful effects (e.g., reproductive cancers, altered development, and behavioral or immune problems) at surprisingly low doses (see e.g., Colborn et al. 1996; Krimsky 2000).  Moreover, some of these low-dose effects may not even occur when the toxicants are present at higher doses (Nagel et al. 1997)!  Whereas endocrine disruption involves surprisingly harmful low-dose effects, hormesis involves apparent beneficial or stimulatory effects produced by low doses of toxic substances (Elliott 2011).  Some researchers suggest that hormesis is widespread and could justify altering government regulatory practices to allow greater public exposures to toxicants (Calabrese and Baldwin 2003).  Multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS) occurs when individuals experience chronic neurological, respiratory, and/or digestive problems when they are exposed to very low levels of chemicals—e.g., pesticides, perfumes, or formaldehyde—that have different and typically less severe effects on other people.
Scientists currently have limited understanding of all three phenomena, although more seems to be known about endocrine disruption than hormesis or multiple chemical sensitivity.  Strikingly, in all three cases scientists have been forced (either explicitly or implicitly) to make difficult linguistic decisions.  The remainder of this section considers two types of decisions: (1) choices about how to categorize these poorly understood phenomena; and (2) choices about the most appropriate terms for describing the phenomena.  The subsequent sections explore how these two types of decisions can influence future scientific research as well as social decision making.   
Categorizing and Conceptualizing Phenomena
Although endocrine disruption has been the subject of growing research interest, it has been notoriously difficult to conceptualize.  For example, scientists did not initially regard diverse cases of what we now call ‘endocrine disruption’ as instances of a single phenomenon.  Instead, they noticed a variety of strange effects in wildlife species, including weakened eggshells, lowered reproduction rates, abnormal mating behavior, and developmental abnormalities (Colborn et al. 1996).  Theo Colborn, a researcher with the World Wildlife Fund, integrated information from a variety of scientists in order to arrive at a unifying concept involving effects of environmental pollutants on organisms’ hormonal systems.
Even after Colborn developed the endocrine-disruption concept, it has continued to be difficult to define.  For example, when the EPA developed its Endocrine Disruptor Research Program in 1996, it defined an endocrine disruptor as “any exogenous agent that interferes with the production, release, transport, metabolism, binding action, or elimination of natural hormones in the body…” (Krimsky 2000, 82; italics added).  At an important meeting in 1996 that was organized by the International Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union, and the World Health Organization, however, endocrine disruptors were defined somewhat differently, as “any exogenous substance that causes adverse health effects in an intact organism, or its progeny, consequent to changes in endocrine function” (quoted in Krimsky 2000, 88; italics added).  
The differences between the EPA and OECD definitions of ED appear to be significant.  Whereas the EPA merely requires interference with the endocrine system, the OECD explicitly requires in vivo evidence that a substance actually causes harm to the organism.  Therefore, as Sheldon Krimsky (2000, 88) emphasizes, one might think that the OECD definition sets too high a standard of proof for identifying endocrine disruptors, especially for the purposes of formulating public policy.  Because of this worry, the U.S. Endocrine Disruptor Screening and Testing Advisory Committee (EDSTAC) failed to arrive at a consensus when it tried to develop a definition for the term ‘endocrine disruptor’.  One of the primary sticking points was the issue of whether an endocrine-modulating substance had to produce observable adverse effects in order to count as an endocrine disruptor (Krimsky 2000, 214).
Multiple chemical sensitivity has also been very difficult to conceptualize and categorize.  Initially, various “syndromes” were defined in terms of the distinctive causes that appeared to initiate the intolerances of some chemically sensitive patients.  These diseases include sick building syndrome (SBS), Gulf War syndrome (GWS), or wood preservative syndrome (WPS) (Ashford and Miller 1998).  Based on the similar effects associated with these syndromes, they are now often grouped under the more general category of MCS, but it has been difficult to define.  For example, Nicholas Ashford and Claudia Miller (1998, 314-315) have presented six different case definitions that various organizations and individuals have proposed.  They vary in terms of the precise number of organ systems that must be affected in order to satisfy the definition, whether instances in which other accepted clinical or psychological conditions are present can also count as instances of MCS, and whether a provocative challenge or environmental exposure must be documented.
In the case of hormesis, the most obvious conceptual difficulty has been deciding whether to categorize it as a distinct phenomenon at all or whether to lump it together with a wide range of other low-dose toxicological phenomena.  For example, Kristina Thayer and her coauthors argue that “many examples used to support the widespread frequency of hormesis are better described by the more general term ‘nonmonotonic’ dose responses.  Nonmonotonic is used to describe dose-response relationships in which the direction of a response changes with increasing or decreasing dose” (Thayer et al. 2005, 1271).  In other words, they suggest that hormesis researchers are trying to create an unnecessary concept.  They point out that we already have the concept of biphasic or nonmonotonic dose responses (i.e., effects that do not uniformly increase or decrease in response to changing dosages).  Although they do not fully develop the argument, one way of supporting their position would be to argue that it is unnecessary to create an additional concept unless it carves out a highly distinctive and uniform phenomenon.  Although some researchers think that the hormesis phenomenon meets these criteria, others remain unconvinced.
Another issue involved in categorizing hormesis is how broadly to define it.  Edward Calabrese and a number of coauthors recently proposed a very broad definition of hormesis that includes not only nonmonotonic dose-response relationships but also preconditioning responses to stress (Calabrese et al. 2007). Preconditioning occurs when an organism or cell that is exposed to a stressor (e.g., ionizing radiation, mutagenic chemicals, hypoxia) exhibits an adaptive response, such that it is better able to handle subsequent, more massive exposures to the same stressor. Whether or not this encapsulation of preconditioning phenomena under the hormesis label turns out to be scientifically fruitful, it has intriguing social ramifications.  Associating hormesis with a greater range of phenomena, such as preconditioning, is likely to promote greater familiarity with the concept and more acceptance of it by other scientists, policy makers, and the public.  Some researchers have also placed the beneficial effects of exercise and healthy eating under the general umbrella of hormetic phenomena, which is again likely to promote wider social recognition and acceptance of it (see e.g., Mattson 2008).  Given that the mechanisms responsible for hormesis are still poorly understood, however, these choices about how to categorize the phenomenon are highly underdetermined by available scientific information.
Descriptive Terms
	In addition to the difficulty of choosing appropriate categorizations for these poorly understood phenomena, scientists also have to make decisions about what terms to use for describing them.  In the endocrine disruption case, the biggest issue has been whether the term ‘endocrine disruptor’ itself is appropriate.  Some stakeholders have worried that the language of “disruption” unjustifiably encourages the notion that any interference or influence on the endocrine system is harmful or “disruptive.”  Therefore, when a National Academy of Sciences panel analyzed the issue, it chose to use the term “hormonally active agent” (HAA) instead.  The panel claimed that “the term [endocrine disruptor] is fraught with emotional overtones and was tantamount to a prejudgment of potential outcomes” (NRC 1999, 21).  Evidently the members of the panel felt that it would be less prejudicial if chemicals were merely labeled as hormonally “active.”
The term ‘multiple chemical sensitivity’ has also come under fire.  Researchers have proposed a wide range of alternative names for it, including idiopathic environmental intolerance, mass psychogenic illness, universal allergy, 20th-century illness, environmental maladaptation syndrome, immunologic illness, and chemical AIDS (Ashford and Miller 1998, 28).  One of the most controversial aspects of these different terms is their alleged potential to incline policy makers and members of the public toward the conclusion that MCS is either psychologically or physiologically based.  This is significant, because scientists currently disagree about whether MCS is a genuine physiological response to chemical exposures or whether it is a psychological phenomenon akin to post-traumatic stress disorder.  
At an important 1996 conference in Berlin (sponsored by the International Program on Chemical Safety, or IPCS), the participants proposed that MCS be renamed “idiopathic environmental intolerances” (IEI).  According to the conference’s final report, the term “multiple chemical sensitivities” is problematic, because “it makes an unsupported judgment on causation [of the phenomenon]” (Anonymous 1996).  As Ronald Gots, one of the key participants at the conference, argued, “The premature use of the term multiple chemical sensitivities has hampered effective exploration of and response to this phenomenon, because it suggests, to the lay person, a physiological explanation” (Gots 1996).  The conference participants felt that the label of IEI would be less likely to be misconstrued, and they defined it as:
− an acquired disorder with multiple recurrent symptoms
− associated with diverse environmental factors tolerated by the majority of people
− not explained by any known medical or psychiatric/psychologic disorder (Anonymous 1996, S188)     
In contrast, other scientists have expressed opposing concerns about how the label of IEI could be misinterpreted.  Nicholas Ashford and Claudia Miller make the following claim:
Soon after the Berlin meeting, certain workshop participants reported to the media and at scientific meetings that the “idiopathic” in IEI meant “self-originated” rather than “being of unknown etiology” (a more familiar meaning of the term as it is used in medicine)—and they erroneously proclaimed that IEI had become WHO’s official name for the condition….  (Ashford and Miller 1998, 284)
Thus, Ashford and Miller worry that the IEI label may have problems of its own that are the opposite of those associated with the term MCS; in other words, it may facilitate an unjustified interpretation of the phenomenon as psychogenic.  Because of similar concerns, a number of prominent scientists wrote a letter to the IPCS, denouncing what they perceived as significant conflicts of interest that may have caused the participants at the Berlin Meeting to be biased in favor of corporate interests (Ashford and Miller 1998).
	In the hormesis case, we have already seen that researchers have debated whether to talk about ‘hormesis’ at all or whether to employ a more general category, like “nonmonotonic” dose responses.  Another issue has been whether to use the terms ‘adaptive’ or ‘generalizable’ to describe the hormesis phenomenon.  On one hand, it seems plausible that hormesis could be the consequence of evolutionary pressures that favored biological mechanisms for gleaning benefits from low levels of stressors in the environment.  On this basis, prominent hormesis researcher Edward Calabrese goes so far as to include the adaptiveness of hormesis as part of his preferred definition for the phenomenon (Calabrese and Baldwin 2002).  Others question whether there is convincing evidence for the notion that hormetic effects are adaptive (Axelrod 2004; Thayer 2005).  At the very least, it may be difficult in many cases to determine whether alleged examples of hormesis are adaptive or not.  The notion that hormesis is highly “generalizable,” which Calabrese emphasizes frequently (Calabrese and Baldwin 1998; Calabrese and Baldwin 2003), is also ambiguous and controversial.  Some researchers complain that, even if the ‘generalizability’ label could be made precise, it is too difficult to provide evidence for the generalizability of hormesis until researchers clarify the mechanisms that are responsible for producing it (van der Woude et al. 2005). 

3. Consequences of Selective Language
The previous section has already hinted at how selective decisions about how to categorize and describe scientific phenomena can have significant effects.  In this section, I want to be even more specific about these effects, grouping them into two general categories: (1) influences on the direction and scope of scientific research; and (2) influences on social decision making.  Thus, this section highlights the importance of thinking very carefully about what language to use for communicating about uncertain or poorly understood phenomena.  
Influences on the Direction and Scope of Research
	One reason why choices about the categories and terms discussed in the previous section are important is that they can influence the future course of scientific research.  Thus, not only do these linguistic choices represent selective (albeit often implicit) choices to emphasize some features of poorly understood phenomena rather than others, but these choices can influence what sorts of information are likely to be gathered in the future.
  	Consider, for example, a point that Sheldon Krimsky (2000) makes about endocrine-disruption research.  He notes that the phenomenon initially fell largely between the cracks of mainstream scientific disciplines and was therefore slow to receive recognition and research attention.  However, he thinks that the choice to employ a unifying concept made a huge difference: 
The significance of the integrative concept [i.e., endocrine disruption or HAA] is that it magnifies the importance of many otherwise disparate, less notable events. In some respects, the term environmental endocrine disrupter is for the media analogous to the term cancer. Many variant diseases are all categorized under the rubric of cancer because they have in common abnormally formed, unregulated, and invasive cells. Their causes, mechanisms, and outcomes may be vastly different. But having a single concept that unites these variant diseases heightens the public’s attention to each individual disease. . . . Because so many outcomes are linked to the term [endocrine disruptor or HAA], the mere frequency with which the term is used in the media reifies the concept in the public mind.  (Krimsky 2000, 104)
Krimsky argues that the increased public concern created by this unifying concept created interest in ED among important figures in the U.S. Congress, which led in turn to increased funding to study the phenomenon.  Therefore, the choice to employ a unifying concept has helped to shift this area of research from the sidelines to the forefront of environmental studies.
	Somewhat similar dynamics may be visible in the hormesis case.  ED researcher Frederick vom Saal (2007) argues that industry groups have been motivated to study hormesis in part because they are worried that the phenomenon of endocrine disruption could necessitate stricter regulation of pollutants.  Vom Saal thinks that hormesis is regarded by these groups as part of a strategy for arguing against stricter regulations.  It is clearly in their interests to claim that hormesis represents a distinct low-dose phenomenon that is widely generalizable and that may be associated with well-known phenomena such as the beneficial effects of exercise or preconditioning responses to stress.  The choice to describe and categorize hormesis in this way encourages the notion that scientists have uncovered a new phenomenon that merits further investigation.  In contrast, if one follows Thayer (2005) in arguing that there are a wide variety of nonmonotonic low-dose phenomena, none of which merits a special label of its own, it becomes much less plausible that the presence of occasional low-dose beneficial effects from toxicants merits serious research scrutiny, let alone changes to regulatory policy. 
	To the extent that the creation of the hormesis concept increases research interest in the phenomenon, it may also have a variety of secondary effects on research agendas in the environmental sciences.  For example, Joel Tickner (2005) worries that attention to hormesis could decrease research on the prevention of health threats from toxic chemicals.  In general, Tickner is concerned that the environmental sciences tend to be overly focused on narrow inquiries that are focused within existing disciplinary traditions and that aim to provide detailed information about threats that are already known.  He argues that we need to foster more creative, interdisciplinary approaches that can identify new hazards and provide new strategies for preventing existing hazards.  With this in mind, he worries that attention to hormesis will tie up “research and regulatory policy in long debates over minute details of risk—all at the expense of primary prevention” (Tickner 2005, 228).
	The previous section also noted that the label of ‘multiple chemical sensitivity’ or MCS could influence the direction of future research.  Ronald Gots has specifically worried that this particular label unjustifiably emphasizes the notion that it is a primarily physiological phenomenon while downplaying the possibility that it is primarily psychological.  As a result, Gots worries that the term ‘MCS’ tends to inhibit research and policy responses based on psychological interpretations of the phenomenon.  He and other participants at the Berlin conference encouraged scientists to use the term ‘idiopathic environmental intolerance’ instead in an effort to avoid this effect.  Thus, all three case studies illustrate how the choice of particular terms and categories for describing these phenomena can increase or decrease scientific interest in them and potentially steer research in different directions.		
Influences on Social Decision Making
Choices about how to describe poorly understood phenomena clearly have effects not only on the scientific community but also on society at large.  We have already seen that one of the reasons that terminological choices can increase research funding for phenomena is that they can stimulate public attention and thereby influence the behavior of legislators.  This is one example of the many ways in which categorizations and terms can alter the way members of the public and key policy makers respond to phenomena.  For instance, we have already seen that efforts to describe or define hormesis as an adaptive phenomenon seem likely to incline listeners to the conclusion that it may in fact have significant ramifications for public policy.  After all, adaptive phenomena are typically beneficial to organisms.  We have also seen, however, that the current evidence for the adaptive character of hormesis is limited (Weltje et al. 2005).
The MCS case reveals similar social impacts of linguistic decisions.  The previous section noted that some researchers have encouraged using the label of ‘idiopathic environmental intolerance’ rather than ‘multiple chemical sensitivity’, with the goal of discouraging the notion that the phenomenon is physiological in nature.  To the extent that this linguistic strategy is successful, it could make judges and regulators less likely to force the accommodation of public places to the requests of MCS patients or to hold manufacturers legally liable for their symptoms (Gots 1996: S9).  Many of those suffering from MCS also think that labels like ‘IEI’, to the extent that they are more supportive of psychological conceptualizations of their illness, encourage dismissive or otherwise derogatory attitudes by physicians (Kroll-Smith and Floyd 1997).  These concerns of MCS patients are mirrored in the struggles of other patient groups.  According to David Tuller (2007) of the New York Times, many of those with “chronic fatigue syndrome” worry that this name for their ailment (not to mention the informal, derogatory label “yuppie flu”) “has discouraged researchers, drug companies and government agencies from taking it seriously.”  These patients frequently prefer the British term “myalgic encephalomyelitis” because, according to psychologist Leonard Jason, “You can change people’s attributions of the seriousness of the illness if you have a more medical-sounding name” (Tuller 2007).  Those suffering from endometriosis have similarly complained that the alternate label ‘career woman’s disease’ has inclined medical professionals toward dismissive and inaccurate conclusions about their illness (Capek 2000).    
In the case of endocrine disruption, we find that particular categories even have the potential to shift the burden of proof for taking various sorts of actions in the policy arena.  We have seen that a significant conceptual issue is whether to define the term ‘endocrine disruptor’ so that it refers to any chemical that interferes with some element of the endocrine system or whether to define it more narrowly so that it refers only to chemicals that cause observable adverse health effects as a result of their endocrine-modulating properties.  On one hand, choosing a definition that refers to any chemical interference with the endocrine system could make it easier to classify agents as endocrine disruptors, thereby potentially placing the burden of proof on industrial manufacturers and users of those chemicals to show that their chemicals should not be regulated as stringently as other endocrine disruptors.  On the other hand, choosing a definition that requires evidence of adverse health effects could potentially place the burden of proof on consumer and public-health organizations to show that chemicals are actually harmful before they could be regulated as endocrine disruptors.             

4. Responding to the Effects of Selective Language
	Even if one acknowledges that scientists face significant decisions about how to categorize and describe phenomena under conditions of ignorance and uncertainty, it is not entirely clear how to help scientists respond to this issue.  One difficulty is that researchers are frequently oblivious to the broader social ramifications of the terms that they use or the ways in which they frame scientific phenomena.  An additional challenge is that there are generally not clear standards for determining what sorts of linguistic choices are appropriate or inappropriate.  Very rarely would the decision to describe a phenomenon in one way rather than another constitute a clear case of scientific misconduct.  Moreover, there do not even seem to be many informal guidelines that could constrain how scientists make these decisions.​[1]​  Scientists may be left wondering whether to take social considerations into account when developing scientific language under uncertainty and, if so, how to do so appropriately.
	I have argued elsewhere for a set of three conditions that justify incorporating social considerations in scientific judgments, and I have also provided recommendations on how to incorporate those considerations in a socially responsible manner (Elliott 2011).  These conditions and recommendations may prove helpful to researchers who are developing scientific language in the face of ignorance and uncertainty.  I do not argue that my three conditions are necessary for justifying the appeal to social considerations, but they do appear to be sufficient for doing so.  The first condition is that the scientists working on a particular project have ethical reasons for considering the major societal consequences of their work and for attempting to mitigate the harmful effects that it might have. The second condition is that the scientific situation be one in which available information is uncertain or incomplete. The third condition is that the situation be one in which it would be harmful or impracticable for scientists to respond to this uncertainty by withholding their judgment or supplying only minimally interpreted data to decision makers.
	In cases where scientists are developing scientific language in the face of significant ignorance or uncertainty, all three conditions are often met.  First, numerous ethicists have argued that scientists have at least some responsibilities to take the social consequences of their work into account, either because of specific ethical responsibilities associated with the scientific profession or because of universal moral responsibilities to avoid negligently harming others (Douglas 2009; Elliott 2011; Shrader-Frechette 1994).  Second, the sorts of cases addressed in this paper clearly meet the condition of involving uncertain or incomplete knowledge.  Third, it is especially difficult to withhold judgment or to avoid interpretive judgments when choosing scientific language.  Scientists have to choose some descriptive terms and categories rather than others when communicating to each other and to the public, and they frequently face situations where none of the available linguistic choices are entirely neutral or uncontroversial.
	It is important to keep in mind that this argument does not show that social considerations are the only factors that should play a role in making linguistic decisions under scientific uncertainty.  It does not even show that these should be the primary considerations for scientists.  Other important considerations include the extent to which particular categories or terms are coherent with other scientific theories, the extent to which particular linguistic choices are particularly metaphorically fruitful, and the extent to which these choices foster communication within and between scientific disciplines.  My argument does show, however, that social considerations should not be ignored.
Even if one agrees that social considerations should play a role in choosing scientific language, it is not easy to decide how to incorporate these considerations.  On one hand, natural scientists are generally not trained with a great deal of sophistication about ethical and social matters.  On the other hand, it is often difficult for ethicists, social scientists, or members of the public to contribute to decisions about scientific language, because these decisions typically arise in the midst of cutting-edge scientific work that has not yet become widely known.  Therefore, it may be difficult to find individuals who are well placed to reflect on the social ramifications of scientific language.  Moreover, scientific practice is influenced by a wide range of factors, including funding streams, the interests of scientists, the success of particular research projects, the policies of journals, and the social context in which science is practiced.  Therefore, it would probably be naïve to think that one could adequately influence the development of scientific language just by employing a single strategy, such as adding a special unit on science communication to research-ethics training.
In order to develop a multi-faceted strategy for influencing the development of scientific language in socially responsible ways, it is helpful to consider an insight from science-policy expert Sheila Jasanoff.  She argues that there are three major “bodies” that need to be considered when trying to promote trustworthy scientific information that addresses social problems (Jasanoff 2005).  These include the bodies of knowledge that scientists produce, the advisory bodies or committees through which experts provide advice for policy makers, and the bodies of the experts themselves (i.e., the individuals who disseminate information and offer judgment in policy domains).  By focusing on all three bodies, we can create a diverse strategy for developing socially responsible scientific language in the face of ignorance and uncertainty.  The remainder of this section briefly considers some ways to promote more thoughtful reflection about scientific language by addressing all three bodies.
The Body of Scientific Knowledge
	A significant contemporary threat to the integrity of scientific knowledge comes from heavily funded interest groups who aim to influence scientific research in ways that serve their interests (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Shrader-Frechette 2007).  These influences can take a wide variety of forms: funding specific areas of research, designing studies so as to obtain particular results, suppressing undesirable findings and harassing scientists that disseminate them, paying scientists to produce opinionated letters or commentaries or review essays, and developing strategic public-relations campaigns via the mass media (McGarity and Wagner 2008).  These interest-group strategies can affect scientific language as well as other areas of science.  In the case studies considered in this paper, for example, both Ronald Gots (the scientist who promotes the concept of idiopathic environmental intolerance) and Edward Calabrese (the scientist who promotes the concept of hormesis) have significant ties with industry groups (Elliott 2011).  James Robert Brown (2002) reports another fascinating case: the drug maker Eli Lilly promoted a new medical disease concept, “premenstrual dysphoric disorder” (PMDD), allegedly in order to create new markets and patent protection for its drug Prozac.
	Therefore, one strategy for preserving a body of scientific knowledge (including scientific language in particular) that remains responsive to a range of societal concerns is to find ways to address the conflicts of interest created when powerful interest groups fund or otherwise influence science.  Many universities have responded by creating conflict-of-interest policies for their researchers.  Unfortunately, these policies suffer from a range of limitations (see e.g., Elliott 2011), and they do not prevent seriously biased science from occurring outside of universities.  Several alternative strategies may also be worth pursuing.  One approach is for governments to provide more independent funding for sensitive areas of science, such as biomedical, public-health, and environmental research.​[2]​  Another approach is for universities to prohibit conflicts of interest more frequently, especially when they are particularly egregious (e.g., links between whole departments and private corporations).  Both of these strategies could help to ensure that there are islands of relatively unconflicted academic scientists who can contribute to the development of scientific knowledge in general and scientific language in particular.  Yet another strategy is to create opportunities for thoughtful deliberation among scientists who have a range of perspectives, which leads us to the next “body” discussed by Jasanoff.           
Advisory Bodies
	Jasanoff (1990) has provided very insightful analyses of the ways that the scientific advisory bodies created by government agencies can blend scientific and social considerations in a thoughtful manner.  Others have recently experimented with deliberative venues that bring together not only scientists but also a wider range of stakeholders (NRC 1996; Renn et al. 1995).  These deliberative bodies include consensus conferences, citizens’ juries or panels, public hearings, focus groups, and interactive technology-based approaches.  The goals of incorporating a wide range of stakeholder perspectives in deliberation about scientific research and policy making are at least three-fold: normative, instrumental, and substantive (NRC 1996).  In other words, deliberative proceedings can make decisions more democratic, they can increase public acceptance of decisions, and they can improve the quality of decision making.  In order to achieve these goals, however, it is important to design deliberative venues that are appropriately matched to the needs of particular situations.
	There are precedents in both the endocrine disruption and MCS cases for deliberative proceedings about a range of issues, including linguistic decisions.  In the case of MCS, we have already seen that the Berlin workshop provided an opportunity to deliberate about the language used for classifying and describing the phenomenon.  Unfortunately, this deliberative opportunity was poorly designed.  All of the invited representatives from nongovernmental organizations were from industry-oriented groups rather than labor or patient organizations.  Moreover, the speaker invited to represent U.S. perspectives, Ronald Gots, was the director of a corporate-sponsored research institute that ultimately funded the publication of the workshop proceedings (Ashford and Miller 1998).  This lack of balance in stakeholder perspectives ultimately contributed to significant distrust of the conference findings, including the recommendation to use the term ‘idiopathic environmental intolerance’.
The endocrine disruption case provides a more positive example of the ways that deliberative bodies can assist in developing scientific language in socially responsible ways, even in the face of significant ignorance and uncertainty.  In the late 1990’s, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency created an Endocrine Disruption Screening and Testing Advisory Committee (EDSTAC) to assist it in developing scientifically informed public policy.  The EPA wisely met with multiple stakeholders in an initial effort to discuss how the committee should operate.  They ultimately included members with a wide array of affiliations on the committee, and they allowed for public comment sessions that incorporated input from numerous constituents.  For the purposes of this chapter, it is noteworthy that the committee ultimately decided to provide a general description of endocrine disruption but to avoid providing a precise definition of the phenomenon.  This compromise was a response to the difficulty of deciding whether a chemical must cause adverse effects in order to be considered an endocrine disruptor or whether it need only alter endocrine function.  Therefore, this case provides a model of the sorts of deliberative proceedings that can contribute to developing widely acceptable scientific language in controversial cases that are fraught with uncertainty.   
The Bodies of Experts
   A final strategy for developing scientific language under uncertainty in more socially responsible ways is to work directly with specific experts by providing them with ethical guidance.  Unfortunately, Kenneth Pimple (2002) has pointed out that research ethicists have put much more effort into analyzing ethical issues internal to science (e.g., handling data and assigning authorship) than into analyzing scientists’ responsibilities to society at large.  Nevertheless, some authors have attempted to provide an “ethics of expertise” that could assist scientists in disseminating information (Douglas 2008; Hardwig 1994; Resnik 1998; Shrader-Frechette 1994).  As one central component of an ethics of expertise, I have argued that scientists have prima facie ethical responsibilities to promote the self-determination of those to whom they provide information (Elliott 2010).  Moreover, I have suggested that scientists would benefit by examining how medical practitioners use the principle of informed consent as a guide for preserving self-determination when they provide information (Elliott 2010; see also Resnik 2001).
Of course, it obviously does not make sense for scientists to pass out consent forms to the public when they disseminate their research findings.  There are significant differences between the situation of a scientist who provides a newspaper interview about multiple chemical sensitivity and the situation of a physician who briefs a patient about the risks of surgery.  Nevertheless, both scientists and physicians plausibly have responsibilities to provide information in a manner that allows the recipients to make decisions that accord with their own values (Elliott 2010; Resnik 2001).  Therefore, both scientists and physicians should be sensitive to the major ways in which they can promote or hinder the self-determination of those to whom they provide information.  For example, biomedical ethicists have pointed out that, in order to promote the informed consent of decision makers, those who disseminate information should be sensitive both to the framing of information and to the ways in which information can be misinterpreted by those who hold false beliefs.
In the MCS case, for instance, scientists and physicians should be sensitive to the fact that the major terms used for describing the phenomenon could easily confuse listeners.  Despite ongoing confusion about the sources and nature of the illness, the term ‘MCS’ may give the impression that it is primarily a physiological phenomenon, whereas ‘IEI’ is frequently associated with psychological interpretations.  With this in mind, thoughtful experts should acknowledge the uncertainty surrounding the phenomenon and perhaps acknowledge the ways that the terms or categories they employ could be misconstrued.  Similarly, hormesis researchers may want to avoid referring to hormesis as ‘adaptive’ and ‘generalizable’ because the terms are so ambiguous and potentially confusing.  Or, if they do think that the terms are valuable, they would do well to offer careful definitions of them and note the limitations of current research in supporting the use of such descriptions.  Thus, an ethics of expertise can highlight issues for scientists to keep in mind as they develop language and communicate with others. 

5. Conclusion
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^1	  A good example of an informal guideline that constrains other aspects of scientific practice would be the commonly accepted standard that statistical tests should achieve at least a 95% level of statistical significance.  
^2	  One might object that government funded science is not entirely “independent” and value-free.  This is true, but government-funded scientists generally do not appear to be under pressure to engage in the egregious research activities associated with some industry-funded science (see e.g., McGarity and Wagner 2008).
